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Abstract 
 In this paper, the effect of accruals quality on the role of profit in negotiating an incentive 
contract has been examined. For this purpose, a sample that contains 153 accepted companies in 
stock market since 2003 until 2010 has been considered. For measuring the total accruals quality, 
method of Dechow and Dichev (2002) has been used. According to Francis et al (2005) the accruals 
have been separated in optional and compulsory components. Additionally, for testing hypothesis the 
two methods of multivariate linear regression from Peng (2011) have been used, adopting the method 
of combined data. The results showed that the quality of accruals has no significant relationship whit 
usefulness of profit for negotiating incentive contracts neither in total level nor in level of each 
optional or compulsory component. Nevertheless, quality of accruals in total level and in levels of 
each optional or compulsory component has a direct relationship with the changes in director’s 
reward. Also, the other results of the research have showed that stability and informational content of 
the profit have a direct relationship whit the usefulness of profit for negotiating incentive contracts.  
Keywords: accruals quality, optional accruals, compulsory accruals, profit stability, 
informational content of the profit.  
Introduction  
Business unit's interest is one part of financial statement having a great importance for all of 
the users. It has been mentioned in proclamation NO.1 of financial accounting that the financial 
reports have emphasized the information about the company's performance that is presented through 
the calculation of interest and its component. Since company's interest has a great importance for the 
users of financial statement, the manager tries to misreport the cost of the interest and the way that it 
is presented. There are two main reasons for manipulation of interest (management of interest). The 
first reason is encouraging the investors to buy company's equity and the second reason is to increase 
the company's market value (Kellog and Kellog, 1991). Using the accruals is a method for 
misreporting the company's interest because accrual accounting gives to the managers the choice to 
determine the interest in different periods of time. Actually the managers in the accrual accounting 
system are confronted with the different items for the best time of incomes and costs detection. One 
of these items is fast detection of incomes by selling them on credit. This activity of managers is 
called the management of interest. Manager’s opinion in the detection of reported interest has an 
effect on interest quality and reduces it. The managers equilibrate the reported interest by choosing 
especial accounting politic, accounting estimates and accrual management. The main purpose of this 
paper is to study that whether the accrual quality has any effect on in negotiating an incentive 
contract. To consider them in order to achieve a desired profits and with Investing more in stock, the 
economy has become more prosperous. 
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Literature Review 
 With developing the commerce and industry and a distance between the owner and the 
corporation’s managers, there should be controlled and incentive mechanism for these relationships. 
According to agency theory, the organization has set by a series of contract. The existence of a 
business unit is based on its contract. These contracts can be written or unwritten. One of the most 
important contracts is the reward plan for the owner and the company’s managers. Agency 
relationship is a contract on which the owner delegates the decision-making power to an agent 
(Namazi, 2006).  
The problem for reducing and solving the agency conflict is to make a contract that provides 
incentive for the manager to interact. This kind of contract is named optimal incentive contract. In 
such situation, the required information for making this contract should be provided. Usually this 
contract has two main features: 1)It provides the required information in a risky situation. 2)It makes 
a good base for stakeholders and managers to working in a partnership in risk. The stakeholders and 
the managers should act about two things: 1)They might make a contract that determines the amount 
of salary and benefits and partnership in risk of the manager and stakeholder’s share. 2)They might 
choose an accounting and information system that provides required data for contract’s base. The 
system’s data should be visible and considerable for both manager and stakeholder (Namazi, 2005). 
Contract’s base and reward’s plan can be the criteria based on one of these items: 
1. Accounting interest 
2. Economic criteria of performance evaluation like development of the market value, economic 
value added, Increase of the quantity and quality of production. 
3. Granting of choosing to buy a share to directors 
4. A combination of the above. 
With making an incentive optimal contract we hope that the operation and market value of the 
company increase and it is the result of manager’s effort. 
 The accrual accounting system provides information to conclude and implement agreements. 
The Data generated in the system (for example, accounting profits), will form the basis of many of 
these performance indicators, and has an important role in representing. Therefore, the quality of 
accounting information is used for this very important purpose. Evidence shows that when the 
relationship between accounting interest and stock returns is less, in reward contract for the 
managers, the accounting interest has more importance (Lambert and Larcker, 1987), (Sloan,1993). 
Also, the amount of reaction to benefits is influenced investment opportunities, profitability and 
sustainability information content of interest (Bushman ET el, 2006).  
 Kwon (1989) has proved that the accruals develop the relationship between the efforts of the 
director and the future cash flows. An accounting system based on accrual in incentive contracts 
work more effective than an accounting system based on cash flows. On the other hand, two types of 
failure in accrual accounting earnings are presented as a performance measure. Firstly, it is possible 
that the current and future accruals and cash flows aren’t linked; secondly, it is possible that pattern 
of accruals on cash flows are including factors that are outside the control of managers (Lambert, 
2006).  
 Researchers have defined accruals quality as the predictive power of these items and the 
estimation of future cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), (Francis et al 2005). Thus, accrual-
based interest with high quality, forecasts future cash flows more accurate. Such benefits, however, 
do not necessarily recognize the efforts of managers. For example, the director estimates doubtful 
receivables through his/her experiences, accounts receivable, customer credit quality and current state 
of the economy. If accrual quality is low, it is possible that accounting system is not successful in 
providing accurate information for presenting them to administrators of estimating the amount of 
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doubtful receivables; in conclusion the quality of reported earnings reduces. In contrast, accruals 
quality based information may allow the director to have more precise estimates and to avoid 
reporting low quality interest. In such situation, net profit, would be more appropriate for estimating 
future cash flows and, therefore, will be more effective in determining director remuneration. In this 
regard, accruals quality has two messages for both shareholders and investors. First, the power of 
managers in evaluation and assessment of the accruals and less deviation of profit from cash flow 
that causes, in general, users of financial statements have more confidence in company’s reported 
profits, and probably the public forums of shareholders in the companies with higher accruals quality, 
put more emphasis on detection of Board’s reward as compared to other performance criteria. In 
addition, in these companies, the accounting profit is one of the main elements of the contract of the 
Board’s reward. Thus, this research question is the following: 
 Does the accruals quality have an effect on negotiating an incentive contract? Conducted 
Researches on the basis of this research include foreign and internal research. First, the foreign and 
then internal research will be presented. 
 Shalev et al (2011) in a research titled as the accounting interest and manager’ s reward have 
studied the impact of the company's executive compensation structure on current value in the 
combined companies. The results show that because of using different accounting criteria in 
company s performance detection, the reward contract had an effect on the accounting methods 
which was chosen by the managers. 
 Croci et al (2001) at the research Boards remuneration have investigated the familial control 
and institutional investors, the impact of family ownership and institutional shareholders on the 
remuneration paid to the Board in Continental Europe. They found that family ownership reduces 
potentially the rewarding and also cash bonuses paid to the Board. The results also suggest that 
family ownership can control the additional level of remuneration paid to directors actively and can 
thwart profit-seeking motives of administrators. The results show that institutional shareholders raise 
the remuneration paid to directors. 
 Jiang et al (2009) in a research titled as the impact of ownership concentration on relationship 
between directors reward and company s performance in New Zealand, have examined the effect of 
ownership structure on firm performance related bonuses paid to managers. The results results 
indicate that the companies that have concentrated ownership structure, the relationship between 
management compensation and firm performance is negative and in the companies that doesn’t have 
concentrated ownership structure, the relationship between management compensation and firm 
performance is positive. 
 Goel and Thakor (2009) in a study titled “Why do firms manage interest?”, Concluded that 
companies with high variability in cash flows prize money to the board for smoothing the interest. 
They showed that in some circumstances, rewarding to managers for creating smooth profits is 
desirable. They claimed that most shareholders are the investors with short-term perspective and may 
have to sell the stock in the near future duo to investors need the liquidity which is typically relevant 
with the stock conditions and characteristics. 
 Aria et al (2008) in a research titled as “Is the profit management always better for 
shareholders?” found that managers remove volatile components of profit by income smoothing, and 
they establish a threaded connection between the profits of different years. This makes the 
assessment of the market capitalization of shares depend potentially on patterns of income smoothing 
by managers. As a result, in the periods that the chance of smoothing is less, in the market value of 
the stock return anomalies changes occur.  
 Alfred and Burcin (2006) in research as "ownership structure and director s payment in 
Germany", have studied the relationship between ownership structure and the remuneration paid to 
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directors. In this study they have worked one hundred and sixty German companies during the period 
from 1987 to 2003. The results indicate that the remuneration of directors based on the agency 
theory, decrease the company's profit. On the other hand lack of control of the owner, makes 
administrators able to increase the reward. In firms which the managers try to increase their voting 
rights to receive cash bonuses the link between performance and reward of the manager is weak. 
 Kordestani, and Lotfi (2011) in a study on the relationship between earnings forecast errors 
and accruals have examined the relationship between management forecast errors and accruals in the 
next year. The results of their study show a positive correlation between accruals and earnings 
management prediction error. The results of this study indicate positive relationships between the 
companies that have more volatility in operating cash flows are more.  
 Sajjadi et.al (2011) in a research on the relationship between a manager's bonus plan and the 
criteria for evaluating economic in the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, the effect of 
variable remuneration paid to directors and their ownership of stock on the company s performance 
have been investigated. Using panel data analysis indicated a significant relationship between 
remuneration paid to directors with economic criteria (economic value added, market value added 
and economic value added adjusted) of performance appraisal. The findings suggest significant 
relationship between the percentage of shares owned by managers and the market value added and 
also no relationship with other measures of economic performance.  
 Mashayekhi (2010), in a study titled by “Capital expenditure, accruals and stock returns”, has 
studied accruals anomaly (accrual effect on returns), misfit’s capital expenditure (capital expenditure 
effect on returns) and stock performance by using misfits in Iran's capital market. The results indicate 
that capital expenditure and accruals anomaly exists in Iran and the capital markets and they are 
separated, although these abnormalities may be related in different ways. Their results indicate that 
after controlling for the three Fama and French risk factors, investors earn higher returns, by using 
two misfits rather than only one. 
 Nurvash and hoseini (2009) in a research as “The relationship between disclosure quality 
(reliability and timeliness) and earnings management” have shown earnings management is 
associated with less, because the quality of corporate disclosure can reduce the information 
asymmetry and reduce information asymmetry. Their research shows that between the quality of 
corporate disclosure and earnings management, there is a significant negative relationship. The 
findings indicated a significant negative relationship between being in time incorporate disclosure 
and earnings management.  
 Ghaemi et al (2008) in a research as “The quality of earnings and stock return” have studied 
the relationship between earnings quality by accrual and its components with normal and abnormal 
stock returns in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Accruals have been separated in discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components. The results show accruals and its components have effect on the stock 
return. 
Research hypotheses 
• The first hypothesis, the quality of total accruals is related to profit usefulness in incentive 
contracts. 
• The second hypothesis, compulsory accruals quality is associated with profit usefulness in 
incentive contracts. 
• The third hypothesis, optional accruals quality is associated with profit usefulness in 
incentive contracts. 
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Modeling 
 Firstly we investigate the fundamental variables using data collected. The basic variables are 
included the dependent and independent variables.  
The Dependent Variable 
In hypothesis test model of this research quality of accruals is the dependent variable.  
Accruals Quality Estimation  
To measure the quality of accruals Dechow and Dichev (2002) model will be used. The model 
is calculated as follows:  CACit = β0 + β1CFi,t−1 + β2CFi,t + β3CFi,t+1 + β4∆SALESi,t + β5PPEi,t + εi,t 
In which: 
 CAC: complete accruals current 
CF: Cash function 
ΔSALES: changes in sales revenue 
PPE: gross tangible fixed assets 
𝜀𝜀i,t: Error estimates  
CAC in the complete accruals current is calculated as follows: 
CAC=∆CA-∆CL − ∆Cash+∆STDEBT 
∆CL : Change in current liabilities 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶: Changes in curent assets 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Change in financial receivables 
∆Cash : Change in Cash 
 All the variables divided by the book value of assets scale at the beginning of the time. 
Regression residuals (ε) are the index of accruals quality (AQ). When it is in low value, makes the 
accruals high quality. The bibliography shows that accruals quality has a compulsory component 
which reflects economic fundamentals and an optional component that reflects management's 
choices. Francis and colleagues [13], have separated these components through the use of regression 
models (1-2)  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴i,t = β0 + β1STDSALESi,t + β2STDCFi,t + β3LOGTAi,tβ4NEGEARNi,t + β5OCi,t + εi,t 
In which: 
AQ: the total accruals quality (Accruals Quality residuals obtained from model) 
STDSALES: The standard deviation of sales 
STDCF: the standard deviation of operating cash 
LOGTA: natural logarithm of firm assets 
NEGEARN: net earning negative  
OC: the company's operating cycle 
The amount predicted by the regression models above as compulsory accruals quality are 
presented with symbol AQ-IN in the hypothesis test, and the remaining amount of the optional 
accruals quality are presented with AQ-DIS in the hypotheses test. Francis et al (2005) 
The Dependent Variables  
The change in remuneration paid to the Board as the dependent variable are extracted from 
the companies audited financial statements and it does not need to estimate.  
The Control Variables 
In this study for control the effects of firm-specific characteristics on the results of testing 
hypotheses, the control variables of investment opportunities, profitability and stability of earnings 
information content is used. Method of measurement and estimation are followed:  
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Investment Opportunities 
Investment opportunities in the ratio of market value to the equity value of the company. And 
it is calculated in the following equation: 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖, 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖, 𝑀𝑀  
Market value of the company is obtained from stock market price in the company's shares 
outstanding. Book value of the company is the book value of equity at end of financial period.  
Profit stability 
Based on Kormendi and Lipe (1987), the profit stability is measured by PVR that is current 
value of expected future profits. First, a linear regression model (1-4) estimates from benefit changes 
for periods of 2, 1 and 0 for the sample firms. 
∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
After estimating the coefficients β1 and β2, consistent profits in the year - now, with the 
assumption that the discount rate for all companies is 10%, from equation is calculated as equation 
(1-5): 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1(1 − 𝑉𝑉)(1 − 𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽1 − 𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽2) − 1 
𝑉𝑉 = 1 (1 + 𝑀𝑀)⁄  
r: is the discount rate of the present value of expected future profits. 
Informational content of earnings 
For estimation the informational content of earning base of ….. study, we use the earnings 
response coefficients in which the net profit on stock returns is estimated by the following regression 
model:  
𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + (ERC) ∆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
In the above regression, ERC coefficient is the earnings response coefficients and reflects its 
informational content. In Hypotheses test model this variable is shown with the symbol ERC (Peng, 
2011).  
Methodology 
The method of this research is the kind of quasi-experimental study and of the nature of 
correlation. Because the fundamental purpose of this study is explaining the empirical the 
relationship between the phenomena, theory test and to add to existing knowledge in a particular 
field. And we say “correlation” because in this study the relation between the variable is considered. 
The present study investigates the relationship between the the variable and seeks to prove the 
existence of this relationship based on historical data. Methods used to assess correlations between 
variables is the cross regression. This study includes a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables that the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable has 
examined by regression tests. Accordingly, the number of companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange during the period selected data from 2003 until 2010 is collected, after estimating the 
fundamental variables to study the relationship between these variables can be statistically analyzed. 
Statistical population and sampling method 
The Statistical population of this study includes all companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange, excluding the financial firms and the banks. Select a sample of listed companies in Tehran 
Stock Exchange is considering by the following criteria:  
1. End of the financial year should be at the end of March. 
2. The company shouldn’t have a change in financial year during the study. 
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3. Trading symbol should be active and should be used at least once a year. 
4. Financial information should be available in the period of study. 
5. Therefor the sampling method is systematic exclusion, based on the above considerations the 
companies that do not have the mentioned qualifications are excluded from the sample. 
Hypothesis Test of the research  
The results of the first research hypothesis test 
The first hypothesis tests has been done for the purpose of considering the relationship 
between the quality of the benefit with the interest usefulness for incentive contracts and the 
statistical hypothesis is defined as: 
• 0H :Accruals quality is not associated with benefit from profits for incentive contracts. 
• 1H : Accruals quality is associated with benefit from profits for incentive contracts. 
For the first hypothesis tests, we have used the following regression model that is combination 
of data:  
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In this model, Chaw test is used to find the panel data estimation of model is better or using 
the combined data. The results have been shown in Table (1). 
Table 1: The Results of Chaw Test 
Type of test Test statistic Amount of Test statistic Freedom degree P-Value 
Chaw test F  2.007 1031.6 0.062 
Based on the Chaw table’s results, since the amount of P-Value is more than 0/05, the 
difference in width has ruled from the beginning. In conclusion it is necessary that the first model of 
study be estimated by combined data method. Table 2 presents the results of the first model. The 
model is also estimated by using Eviews software:  
)1(261802.066621.19
*005079.0188485.0*219501.0
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The overall significance of the model, given that the probability (P-VALUE) of F-statistic for 
the 0.05 is smaller than (0.000), with 95% assurance, the overall significance of the model is 
confirmed. According to the model coefficients, only 7.85% of the variation in manager’s 
compensation is explained by the variables in the model. 
Given that the probability (P-VALUE) corresponding to the test is more than 0.05; 
homogeneity of residual variance is approved. In this study, for testing not correlated residuals which 
is one of the assumptions of regression analysis and is called correlation, Watson’s Durbin test has 
been used. In this case, according to preliminary results of Watson statistic Durbin outside the range 
is 1.5 and 2.5 and residual autocorrelation is confirmed. In order to solve this problem in the first 
variable auto correlated AR (1) model is imported. Since after this varies, the amount of the statistic 
Durbin - Watson was close to 2 (2.16), remaining independent model is also verified. 
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Table 2: The Results of the First research Hypothesis Testing by First Model 
Dependent variable: EViews 894 Years – Company 
variable Coefficient t-statistics P-Value Relationship 
Constant factor 32.2435 2.593 0.0097 Positive 
Benefit changes -0.000041 -2.065 0.0392 Negative 
Benefit changes × accruals quality 0.000068 1.002 0.3165 Meaningless 
Benefit changes × Variance of profit to stock 
returns  
-0.000001 -1.705 0.0884 Meaningless 
Benefit changes × Market value to book value -0.000018 -1.139 0.2550 Meaningless 
Benefit changes × profit stability 0.000016 3.476 0.0005 Positive 
Benefit changes × Informational content of profit 0.219501 2.417 0.0158 Positive 
Stock returns 0.188485 2.293 0.0221 Positive 
Stock returns × accruals quality 0.074733 1.490 0.1365 Meaningless 
Stock returns × Variance of profit to stock returns -0.000001 -0.651 0.5149 Meaningless 
Stock returns × Market value to book value 0.003027 0.439 0.6602 Meaningless 
Stock returns × profit stability -0.005079 -3.302 0.0010 Negative 
Stock returns × informational content of profit -32.99419 -1.854 0.0640 Meaningless 
Accruals quality 19.66621 2.490 0.0129 Positive 
Variance of profit to stock returns 0.000001 0.477 0.6328 Positive 
Market value to book value 0.588353 0.581 0.5609 Meaningless 
Profit stability -0.0164842 -0.415 0.6779 Meaningless 
Informational content of profit 112.2648 0.216 0.8288 Meaningless 
AR(1) -0.261802 -8.438 0.0000 Negative 
The coefficient of model determination  0.078597 
F-Statistics  4.146 
(0.0000) 
In addition, to test whether the model is a linear model and also whether the case study is 
linear or not, the Ramsey test has been used. Since the importance level of the test is more than 0.05 
(0.1433), Therefore, based on the zero hypothesis of correct specification of the model is verified and 
there is no error in model. Summary results of these tests have been presented in Table (3). 
Table 3: The Results of the First Tests of the Assumptions of Linear Regression Model 
Jarque-Bera Breusch-Pagan Durbin-Watson Ramsey 
2χ  ValueP −  F  ValueP −  D F  ValueP −  
140.59 0.0000 0.1616 0.0001 2.16 2.145 0.1433 
Based on the result presented in table, since the value of t-statistics associated with variable 
changes × total accruals quality is more than 0/05 ( 0/3165), the H0 hypothesis is accepted and can be 
said that accruals quality is not related to incentive contracts. In conclusion the first research 
hypothesis is rejected with the 95% confidence level. 
The results of the second and third research hypothesis 
To test the second and third hypothesis, the combined data from the following regression 
model is used: 
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This model can be used to determine whether the use of panel data to estimate the model 
would be effective or using combined data from the Chow test. The results of this test have been 
shown in Table (4). 
Table 4: The Results of Model Selection for Testing the Second Research 
Type of test The test statistic The amount of test statistic Freedom degree P-Value 
Chaw test F  2.039 1026.6 0.0578 
According to the results of Chaw test, since the amount of P-Value is more than 0.05 
(0.0578), this hypothesis has been refused and the combined data model can be used.  
Table 5: The Results of the Second and Third Research Hypothesis Testing Using Combined 
Data 
Dependent variable: change in directors remuneration  Views: 893 Years – Company 
Variable Coefficient t P-Value Relationship 
Constant factor 31.618 4.771 0.0000 Positive 
Benefit changes -0.000057 0.484 0.6284 Meaningless 
Benefit changes   × compulsory accruals quality -0.000016 -0.053 0.9571 Meaningless 
Benefit changes   × optional accruals quality 0.000097 1.140 0.2546 Meaningless 
Benefit changes   × Variance of profit to stock returns  -0.000001 -0.189 0.8495 Meaningless 
Benefit change   × Market value to book value -0.000026 -0.722 0.4702 Meaningless 
Benefit change   × benefit stability 0.000013 1.551 0.1212 Meaningless 
Benefit change   × Informational content of profit 0.225955 1.589 0.1123 Meaningless 
Profit return 0.237731 2.207 0.0275 Positive 
Stock returns   × compulsory accruals quality -1.52586 -1.062 0.2884 Meaningless 
Stock returns   × optional accruals quality 0.051250 0.495 0.6201 Meaningless 
Stock returns   × Variance of profit to Stock returns  -0.00001 -1.121 0.2624 Meaningless 
Stock returns   × Market value to book value 0.002894 0.206 0.8361 Meaningless 
Stock returns   × profit stability -0.003996 -0.541 0.5881 Meaningless 
Stock returns   × informational content of profit -25.25036 -1.666 0.0960 Meaningless 
Compulsory accruals quality 294.3936 2.830 0.0048 Positive 
Optional accruals quality 14.05955 2.141 0.0325 Positive 
Variance of profit to Stock returns 0.000001 0.990 0.3224 Meaningless 
Market value to book value 0.825254 0.534 0.5934 Meaningless 
Profit stability -0.234902 -0.478 0.6325 Meaningless 
Informational content of profit -109.5884 -0.128 0.8978 Meaningless 
AR(1) -0.261975 -7.608 0.000 Negative 
Coefficients of determination model 0.085280 
F  (P-Value) (0.0000) 3.866 
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Therefor the second model of the research should be estimated by the combined method. In 
this case, according to the model based on the preliminary results, Durbins Watson statistic value is 
out of range 1.5 and 2.5. Thus this model has the problem. To overcome this problem the variable 
residuals first-order auto correlated AR (1) model has been imported. Table (5) presents the results of 
the second model. 
The model is also has been estimated using Eviews software as follows: 
AR(1)0.261975AQ_DIS14.05955
AQ_IN294.3936RET0.23773131.46863ΔLnComp
ti,
ti,ti,ti,
−+
++=
 
Since the probability (P-VALUE) of F is less than 0.05 (0.0000) with 95% of the certainty, 
overall significance of the model is confirmed. According to the coefficients of determination model, 
only the 8.52 percent of change in reward of managers are in the model by variables. And also for the 
validity of the model and the assumptions of the classical regression, the results of Jarkiv test indicate 
that residues resulting from the estimating the model in the confidence level 95% don’t have the 
normal distribution. Somehow the probability (P-VALUE) is less than 0.05. However, since the 
number of observations is higher than normal due to the central limit theorem can be ignored in the 
model residuals. The homogeneity of variance test that uses cutting - Pagan done, since the amount 
of probability is more than 0.05, the homogeneity of residual variance is approved. And also about its 
review of the remaining correlated with Durbins Watson test, based on the preliminary results, 
Watson statistic Durbin was outside the range 1.5 and 2.5 and residual autocorrelation has been 
confirmed. In order to study this problem in the first variable auto correlated AR (1) model is 
imported. Since after this varies, the amount of the statistic Durbin - Watson was close to 2 (2.15), 
remaining independent model is also verified. In addition, to test whether the model is a linear model 
and also whether the case study is linear or not, the Ramsey test has been used. Since the importance 
level of the test is more than 0.05 (0.1548), Therefore, based on the zero hypothesis of correct 
specification of the model is verified and there is no error in model. Summary results of these tests 
are presented in Table 6:  
Table 6: The Results of Testing the Assumptions of the Linear Regression, Second Model 
Jarque-Bera Breusch-Pagan Durbin-Watson Ramsey 
2χ  ValueP −  F  ValueP −  D F  ValueP −  
131.864 0.0000 0.140 1.0000 2.15 2.027 0.1548 
The analysis of the second research hypothesis 
In the second hypothesis the relationship between accruals quality and usefulness of benefit 
for companies been studied and the statistical hypothesis has been defined as:  
• H0: Compulsory accruals quality isn’t associated with profit usefulness in incentive 
contracts. 
• H1: Optional accruals quality is associated with profit usefulness in incentive contracts 
Based on the result presented in table 5, since the value of t-statistics associated with variable 
changes × total accruals quality is more than 0.05 ( 0.9571), the H1 hypothesis is refused and can be 
said that optional accruals quality is not related to incentive contracts. In conclusion the second 
research hypothesis is rejected with the 95% confidence level. 
Result analysis of third hypothesis testing 
In the third hypothesis the relationship between optional accruals quality and usefulness of 
benefit for companies been studied and the statistical hypothesis has been defined as:  
H0: Optional accruals quality isn’t associated with profit usefulness in incentive contracts. 
H1: Compulsory accruals quality is associated with profit usefulness in incentive contracts 
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Based on the result presented in Table (5), since the value of t-statistics associated with 
variable changes × total accruals quality is more than 0.05 ( 0.2546), the H1 hypothesis is refused and 
can be said that optional accruals quality is not related to incentive contracts. In conclusion the third 
research hypothesis is rejected with the 95% confidence level. 
Conclusion 
This was an attempt to study in which the effect of accruals quality on the profit in incentive 
contracts has been examined. Empirical evidence derived from testing hypotheses using linear 
regression and combined data suggests that the quality of accruals in the overall level and also in its 
compulsory and optional components has no significant relationship with profit usefulness in 
incentive contracts. Nevertheless, benefit accruals quality irrespective of changes in it, both in 
general and in each optional and compulsory components are directly related to changes in executive 
bonuses. In addition the findings confirmed that stability of earnings and informational content of 
earnings have a direct relationship with usefulness of profit for incentive contracts and also with 
increasing the amount og profit stability or informational content of profit, the usefulness of profit for 
incentive contracts will increase. Thus it can be concluded that the Iranian capital market, the 
stability in corporate profitability and high earnings response coefficients are considered by the 
shareholders. Somehow that it is reflected in the increase of manager’s reward. In addition, the 
results confirmed the direct relationship between stock returns and reward of executives. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Baber, Kang, and Kumar(1999) and it is a complementary 
of Namazi (2006) and Sajjadi et.al (2011) 
Recommendations based on research findings 
At this stage, according to the findings of the study, the following recommendations are 
offered: 
1. To determine the amount of manager’s reward the incentive plans based on performance 
indicators such as economic value added, market value and other capital market-based criteria 
might be used. It can be said that accrual profits represents management's expectations for the 
events of potential future. For this reason of the measurement have probably some errors. 
2. The focus on profit alone cannot be a criterion for determining executive remuneration and 
incentive contracts and the quality of profits and cash flows caused it might be considered. 
Recommendations regarding future research 
1. It is suggested that in future the researchers do a comparative projects in reward plan Iran and 
other countries.  
2. It is suggested that in a study incentive contracts between managers in different industries as 
well as public and private companies be compared.  
3. It is suggested that in future research the performance evaluation of new tools such as 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in determining the 
amount of remuneration for Directors be examined and a model might be presented. 
The limitations of the research 
The limitations of this study that we have been encountered was lack of control in some 
circumstances, such as the political and economic conditions that have the effect on firm performance 
(split mode) and market performance (in macro mode). Therefore, in generalizing the results of this 
research, care must be taken.  
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